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Like many developing countries, small enterprises and farmers in China suffer 
from a lack of access to capital.  They can rarely get credit from banks.  In China, there 
are over 800 million rural inhabitants who engage in farming, forestry, fishery, and 
livestock and poultry; and there are over 20 million township and village enterprises 
(TVEs), which account for about 30% of GDP, an important force in the growth of the 
national economy.  Although there are many commercial banks in China, they don’t 
operate in the below-county-level areas due to the operation cost, high financial risk, and 
low return.  The rural sector is now served by a state bank (Agricultural Bank of China), 
a policy bank (Agricultural Development Bank of China), and thousands of Rural Credit 
Cooperatives (RCCs).   
RCCs were initiated in the early 1950s to combat usury and since have been the 
core of the rural financial system.  The principle of RCCs is to serve agriculture, rural 
areas, and farmers.  RCCs are a main force in rural finance and play a most important 
role in mobilizing rural household savings, channeling a significant share into loans made 
to TVEs, and funneling capital to agricultural and other development projects in the rural 
areas.  
          The rural credit cooperatives in China are not “cooperative” financial institutions 
by nature.  According to the definition by the International Labor Organization in 1994, a   2
cooperative is a voluntary organized and democratically managed organization.  And The 
Management Rules of Rural Credit Cooperatives in China in 1997 defines the credit 
cooperatives as an organization that members could voluntarily buy shares, implement 
democratic management, and share risks and benefits.  However, China’s RCCs have 
never met the above standards.  The members, who join mostly under governmental 
regulation, have never managed the organizations and have no freedom to withdraw 
membership.  Before 1996, RCCs were managed by the Agricultural Bank of China and 
only afterwards were restructured as a separate set of institutions.  The RCCs are still 
partly under the control of the local governments which tend to increase the supply of 
capital to agricultural production with little attention paid to institutional sustainability.  
With control and interference of local governments and local branches of the state banks 
as well as problems in self-operation, the RCCs have a problem with non-performing 
loans.  As such the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, reported, the RCCs had a 
combined negative net worth.  
          Currently, there are many controversies regarding the future of RCCs.  Some 
suggest the bankruptcy of RCCs, but since this would cause substantial financial losses to 
rural depositors, especially low-income rural households, it is politically difficult.  Some 
propose to change the RCCs to the real cooperatives, but as Xie Ping analyzes, there is no 
environment for the existence of real cooperative system in China.  One feasible proposal 
is to continue the existence of the nominal cooperative institutions but restructure the 
RCCs to commercial banks, reform RCCs’ operation, and restrict the intervention of the 
government.  
          To restructure and reform RCCs, it is necessary to know more about the current 
scale and efficiencies for RCCs.  Efficiencies in the RCCs may not exist for several   3
reasons.  Firstly, under the management of the Agricultural Bank, the RCCs incentive to 
make loans to clients to make profit is limited and mostly they just transfer the saving 
surplus to the Agricultural Bank after the politically forced loans to TVEs or farmers.  As 
such, bankruptcy or decrease of employees’ salary was not a consequence.  They 
virtually worked as saving institutions in rural areas.  Secondly, there were over 650 
thousand employees working for the RCCs with average per capita assets 21,900 
thousand Yuan and average per capita cost as high as 42 thousand Yuan in 1999.  If the 
RCCs are becoming more efficient, then improved profitability, greater amounts of funds 
intermediated, and better service quality for rural customers are expected.  
          This article will provide empirical evidence on the non-existence or existence of 
economies of scale and scope, and efficiencies in RCCs in China.  The empirical results 
provide the basis for research on the restructuring of RCCs.  
Estimation Approaches 
          Both parametric and nonparametric methods are used to evaluated scale economies 
and efficiencies in RCCs in China.  The parametric method captures and isolates 
statistical noise present in the data but is less flexible due to an assumed functional form, 
while the nonparametric method is less restrictive without imposing a specific functional 
form, but cannot effectively remove noise from the data.  
Parametric Method 
          With the parametric method, the normalized quadratic cost function is used to 
assess scale and scope economies in RCCs in China. The normalized quadratic cost 
function is a flexible functional form based on the second order Taylor series 
approximation.  
          The normalized quadratic cost function with m+1 inputs and n outputs is    4
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where C’ is the normalized cost (cost divided by the m+1th input price), wi’ is the ith 
normalized input price, and Yi is the ith output quantity.  The normalized quadratic cost 
function is linear homogeneous in input prices and twice continuously differentiable.  
Homogeneity is realized by the normalization process and symmetry is imposed by 
setting aij=aji and bij=bji.  To be consistent with economic theory, the cost function must 
be concave in input prices and convex in outputs. 
          Using Shephard’s lemma, the compensated input demand function (Xi) can be 
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          The cost function and input demand functions are estimated simultaneously using 
the method of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR).  
          In a multiproduct firm, economies of scale result from two sources: product-
specific economies and/or economies of scope.  Product-specific economies hold all other 
products constant and see how cost changes as one or a group of products vary.  The 
product-specific economies of scale (Si(Y)) are measured by the ratio of average 
incremental cost (AICi) over it’s marginal cost.  The product-specific economies of scale 
are expressed as following: 
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where C’(Y) is the cost of producing the entire multiproduct output bundle; C’(YN-i) is 
the cost of producing all of the outputs except the ith output.  If Si(Y) is greater than one, 
the product-specific returns to scale is increasing; if Si(Y) is less than or equal to 1, then 
the product-specific returns to scale is decreasing or constant, respectively. 
          Economies of scope, which arise from diversification, result from cost savings 
obtained from the simultaneous production of several different outputs in a single 
enterprise.  It measures the relative increase in cost that would occur from splintering 
production of output bundle into separate groups when a firm is facing a given set of 
prices and other exogenous factors.  The degree of economies of scope relative to set i 
(SCi(Y)) is defined as  













Economies of scope exist if SCi(Y) is greater than zero, which indicate that the cost of 
producing the optimal level of outputs in individual firms is greater than the cost of 
producing the same level of outputs in a single multiproduct firm.   
          The combination of product-specific economies of scale and economies of scope 
yields the measure of overall returns to scale.  The degree of the scale economies defined 


















If SN(Y) is greater than 1, then the returns to scale is said to be increasing; if SN(Y) is less 
than 1, then the returns to scale is said to be decreasing; if SN(Y) is equal to 1, it indicates   6
that the firm is operating at its optimum size and hence that the productivity of inputs 
cannot be improved by increasing or decreasing the size of the firm.  
Nonparametric Method 
          With the nonparametric approach, data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used to 
measure technical efficiency, alloctive efficiency, economic efficiency and overall 
efficiency as well as economies of scale.  DEA involves the utilization of mathematical 
programming techniques to construct a best-performance benchmark from the observed 
data on inputs and outputs.  Measuring performance against best practice, firms can 
identify and then improve their less efficient practices.  When there are many firms each 
producing multiple outputs from multiple inputs included in a DEA analysis, the 
benchmark of a firm will be made up of more than one firm unless the firm is the best-
performance in producing all outputs.  A firm will not usually be the best-performance in 
producing all outputs and consequently, the best-performance benchmark of a firm may 
include a number of firms that are best-performance in producing one or more outputs. 
          Pure technical efficiency is a measurement of how far off the production function a 
firm is.  It indicates the potential reduction in inputs a firm can achieve by adopting the 
best production and/or management practices of the best-performance firm.  Allocative 
efficiency is a measurement of pricing efficiency.  It examines whether a firm is using the 
optimal input mix to produce the observed output.  Allocative inefficiency occurs when a 
firm does not equalize marginal returns with true factor market prices.  Economic 
efficiency, or X-efficiency is the combination of pure technical and allocative efficiency.  
To be economically efficient, a firm needs to optimize some economic goal, such as cost 
minimization or profit maximization.  Allocative efficiency is about doing things right, 
and economic efficiency is about doing the right things right (Barr, Killgo, Siems, and   7
Zimmel).  The overall efficiency represents the minimum cost of producing a level of 
output, given input prices and a constant returns to scale technology.  It is a combination 
of pure technical efficiency, allocative efficiency and scale efficiency.  
          RCCs allocate resources and control internal processes by effectively managing 
their sources, facilities, and employees.  RCCs that do this best are the best performance 
banks and are on the efficient frontier and have a measure with unit value.  RCCs can 
employ DEA model to benchmark their processes and find potential areas for 
improvement. 
Data and Procedures 
  The normalized quadratic cost function in this study consists of 5 outputs and 3 
inputs.  The outputs for RCCs are flow capital loan to TVEs (Y1), fixed asset loans to 
TVEs (Y2), agricultural loans (Y3), other loans (Y4), and the deposit to other banks (Y5). 
The outputs are based on the balance sheet of credit funds of RCCs.  Flow capital loans to 
TVEs means the loans restricted to be used as flow capital, such as operating cash, 
inventory and short-term investment; and fixed asset loans are the loans restricted to be 
used for buying or constructing fixed assets.  Agricultural loans are loans to country 
communities or individual farmers, which are used for buying machinery, fertilizer, or 
other production materials.  Other loans refer to non-agriculture related loans not in the 
first three categories and include loans to industry or business.  Different loans may have 
different interest rates that are set by the government to support some specific production.  
The inputs for RCCs consist of total fixed deposits (X1), total current deposits (X2), and 
employees (X3).  Total assets are mostly composed of loans with fixed assets typically 
accounting for less than 2%.  For this reason, along with data issues, fixed assets were not   8
included as an input.  This is easily understood when looking at the RCCs’ simple office 
supplies and small operating space in rural country.  
  The sample ranges from 1980 to 1995, and includes 29 out of 31 provinces and 
regions in China. Among them, Hainan province was set up in 1986 and before that, it 
was a part of Guangdong province and data are not available.  Since Chongqing became a 
Central Government-Administered Municipality in 1997, the estimation looks it as a part 
of Sichuan province.  Tibet is not included due to unavailable data.  There are 457 
observations.  The source of the data is China Rural Finance Almanac in respective years.  
The cost and input prices are normalized using the interest rate of current deposit.  The 
summary of the data is shown in the table 1. 
          Considering some associations among the performance of rural credit unions and 
the development of the regions where they are located as well as the favorable 
government policies for certain regions, analysis is conducted for the whole country and 
for six regions, which are North region, including Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, and 
Inner Mongolia; Northeast region, including Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjing; East 
region, including Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, and Shandong 
provinces; Middlesouth region, including Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, 
and Hainan; Southwest region, including Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan; and Northwest 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Sample RCCs (457) Observations 
Variable                                                         Minimum       Maximum         Average       Standard Deviation 
Y1-Flow capital loan to TVEs (¥0,000)                 64           5458000           219240               508130 
Y2-Fixed asset loans to TVEs (¥0,000)                    0          1108700             39734                100810 
Y3-Agricultural loan (¥0,000)                            1653           1413000           162140               212130 
Y4-Other loan (¥0,000)                                             0           2940700            78385                263140 
Y5-Deposit to other banks (¥0,000)                          0           2097700          233960                296870 
X1-Fixed deposits (¥0,000)                                 1426           7333700          477990                837400 
X2-Curent deposits (¥0,000)                               5998           4792200           255560               455210 
X3-Number of employees                                     979               67185             19131                 13885 
W1-Interest rate of fixed deposits (%)             5.3213              12.132            8.3415                2.2177 
W2-Interest rate of current deposits (%)              1.92                  3.15            2.7407                0.3506 
W3-Average salary (¥)                                     559.28               13041            2610.7                2500.6 
                                                11
Empirical Results   
 Results from Parametric Methods 
           The cost function and two input demand equations were estimated using Iterative 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (ITSUR) with and without curvature imposed.  The 
curvature was imposed using Cholesky decomposition, which is shown by Featherstone 
and Moss.  
          Table 2 presents the price elasticity estimates for fixed deposit, current deposit, and 
employees with and without curvature imposed for the whole country and six regions.  
They were calculated at the mean of the input prices and output quantities.  Price 
elasticity estimate for current deposit was recovered by homogeneity.  For the whole 
country, the own-price elasticities without curvature imposed for fixed deposits and 
current deposits are positive.  This indicates that curvature doesn’t hold.  With curvature 
imposed, all own-price elasticities are negative, which indicates that the input demand 
curves are downward sloping
*.  All own price elasticities are inelastic.  Except in 
Northeast and Middle South regions, fixed deposit is net complements for both employee 
and current deposit. 
          Table 3 shows the product-specific economies of scale and economies of scope for 
each output and the economies of scale over the entire product set with and without 
curvature imposed.  For the whole country, both without and with curvature imposed, 
flow capital loan to TVEs, fixed assets loan to TVEs, and deposit to other banks are 
produced at the mean with increasing returns to scale.  This indicates that the RCCs could 
improve cost efficiency by increasing their sizes.  But since both measures for flow  
                                                 
* The forward analysis will be referred to with curvature imposed.  The analysis for without curvature 
imposed will be similar.   12
Table 2. Input Demand Price Elasticities 
                           Input                                                  Price                                                                     Price 
Region                                                  Fixed Deposit      Current Deposit      Employee       Fixed Deposit   Current Deposit   Employee 
                                                      Curvature not imposed                                                 Curvature imposed 
 Country               Fixed Deposit              0.0835                  -0.0831             -0.0003             -0.0001              0.0003            -0.0002 
                             Current Deposit          -0.4541                   0.4506              0.0035              0.0017              -0.0044             0.0027           
                             Employee                   -0.2834                   0.5320             -0.2485             -0.1589               0.4051            -0.2462 
                            
 
  North                  Fixed Deposit             -0.0001                   0.0007            -0.0006             -0.0051               0.0056            -0.0005   
                             Current Deposit           0.0052                  -0.0096             0.0044               0.0444              -0.0048             0.0041 
                             Employee                   -0.5792                   0.5644             0.0129              -0.4893               0.5350            -0.0456 
  
Northeast              Fixed Deposit             0.0097                  -0.0099              0.0002             -0.0002              -0.4244E-04     0.0002 
                              Current Deposit        -0.0710                   0.0706               0.0004            -0.0003               -0.0001            0.0004 
                              Employee                  0.1949                    0.0513             -0.2462              0.2054                0.0462           -0.2015 
 
    East                   Fixed Deposit            0.0014                  -0.0012             -0.0002              -0.0001               0.0004           -0.0002 
                              Current Deposit       -0.0077                    0.0037              0.0040               0.0023              -0.0063            0.0040 
                              Employee                -0.2169                    0.5754             -0.3585              -0.2112               0.5697           -0.3584 
   
  Middle South           Fixed Deposit           0.0390                  -0.0390              0.3169E-04       -0.6774E-05      -0.4978E-04    0.5655E-04 
                                   Current Deposit       -0.1661                   0.1642              0.0018              -0.0002              -0.0015            0.0017            
                                   Employee                 0.0240                    0.3246            -0.3487                0.0421               0.3093           -0.3514          
  
     Southwest             Fixed Deposit            0.0488                  -0.0479            -0.0009             -0.0007                   0.0014         -0.0006 
                                   Current Deposit       -0.2004                    0.1945             0.0059              0.0061                  -0.0111          0.0050 
                                   Employee                -0.5310                    0.8212            -0.2901             -0.3459                   0.6315         -0.2856 
 
Northwest              Fixed Deposit           0.0705                    -0.0686          -0.0019             -0.0017                    0.0025        -0.0008 
                              Current Deposit       -0.4621                      0.4476           0.0145              0.0169                   -0.0254         0.0084    
                               Employee               -0.9404                      1.0771          -0.1367             -0.3934                    0.5896        -0.1961 
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capital loan to TVEs and deposit to other banks are almost one, the effect of increasing 
the size won’t be significant for these two outputs.  Agricultural loans and other loans are 
produced with decreasing returns to scale, but also very close to constant returns to scale, 
so we can say that slight diseconomies exist for those two outputs.  The degree of 
economies of scope measures the relative increase in cost that would occur from 
splintering production into two groups: the product being produced alone and the other 
four being produced together.  For the whole country, both with and without curvature 
imposed, all measures are slightly negative, indicating that scope economies do not exist.  
With curvature imposed, the splintering of production of those five outputs will reduce 
costs by 5.85% to 6.73%.  The combination of both product-specific economies of scale 
and economies of scope yield the overall measure of the returns to scale.  The RCCs are 
producing at a decreasing return to scale for the country as a whole, indicating slight 
diseconomies of scale exist.   
  For North region, flow capital loan, other loan, and deposit to other banks are 
produced at increasing return to scale while the production of fixed assets loan to TVEs 
and agricultural loan are produced at decreasing return to scale.  Only flow capital loan to 
TVEs has scope economies, which indicates that the combination of flow capital loan to 
TVEs with other else could reduce cost by 17.84%.  Although except the flow capital 
loan to TVEs, all other products have negative measure on economies of scope, the 
values are very close to zero, which indicates only very slight scope diseconomies.  
Overall economy of scale is less than 1, which implies that for North region, the outputs 
are being produced in a region of decreasing returns to scale.  
          In Northeast region, both fixed assets loan to TVEs and deposit to other banks have 
   14
 
Table 3. Product-Specific Economies of Scale, Economies of Scope and Economies of Scale 
    
Region             Output                             Product-Specific           Economies of Scope          Economies  
                                                                      Economies of scale                                                    of  Scale 
                                                                   
                                                                   Curvature      Curvature        Curvature     Curvature      Curvature     Curvature                               
                                                                          not imposed   Imposed         not Imposed   Imposed      not imposed    Imposed                                
 
Country       Flow capital loan to TVEs             1.0029            1.0024          -0.0188          -0.0673 
                       Fixed ssets loan to TVEs               1.5903            5.3093          -0.0097          -0.0585 
                       Agricultural loan                            0.9970            0.9912          -0.0093          -0.0587         0.9920        0.9445 
                       Other loan                                      0.9954            0.9959          -0.0111          -0.0604 
                       Deposit to head bank                     1.0075            1.0073          -0.0115          -0.0609 
                          
                    Flow Capital Loan to TVEs           1.0464            1.0463           -0.0616           0.1784 
    North        Fixed assets loan to TVEs               0.8497            0.8561          -0.0257          -0.0349 
                      Agricultural loan                             0.8760            0.9876          -0.0225          -0.0277         0.9230        0.9566 
                      Other loan                                       1.0868            1.0870          -0.0793          -0.0614 
                      Deposit to head bank                      1.0754            1.0758          -0.0748          -0.0010 
                      
                    Flow Capital Loan to TVEs           0.9664            0.8853           -0.0982          -0.1112 
                      Fixed assets loan to TVEs              1.4336            1.0187           -0.1234          -0.1245 
 Northeast     Agricultural loan                             1.0019            0.8238           -0.0369          -0.0480         0.8932        0.9261 
                      Other loan                                       0.9936            0.9854           -0.0645          -0.0654 
                      Deposit to head bank                      1.0400            1.0291           -0.1003          -0.0987 
 
                    Flow Capital Loan to TVEs            0.9948            0.9945          -0.0608          -0.0610 
                      Fixed assets loan to TVEs              1.0662            1.0659           -0.0735          -0.0741 
 East              Agricultural loan                             0.8735            1.0160           -0.0543          -0.0549        0.9150        0.9459 
                      Other loan                                       0.9962            0.9961           -0.0681          -0.0686 
                      Deposit to head bank                      0.9826            0.9825           -0.0509          -0.0514 
  
  Middle        Flow Capital Loan to TVEs           0.9486             0.9542           0.0411            0.0193 
  South           Fixed assets loan to TVEs             1.0044             1.0142          -0.0309           -0.0537 
                      Agricultural loan                            1.0376             1.0244          -0.0268           -0.0570        0.9913       0.9635 
                      Other loan                                       0.9634            0.9587          -0.0081           -0.0295 
                      Deposit to head bank                      0.9910            0.9889          -0.0167           -0.0371 
                     
                      Flow Capital Loan to TVEs           2.4884            3.0673           -0.5147          -0.5147 
Southwest     Fixed assets loan to TVEs              1.2145           -0.6782           -0.0903          -0.1311 
                      Agricultural loan                            0.8276             1.1067          -0.3707           -0.3932        0.7547      0.8748 
                      Other loan                                      1.0726             1.0254           -0.1953          -0.2025 
                      Deposit to head bank                     0.5915             0.5665            0.1892            0.2029 
                     
                      Flow Capital Loan to TVEs           1.3645            1.3118           -0.2273          -0.2072 
Northwest     Fixed assets loan to TVEs              1.1389            1.1305            0.0009          -0.0247         0.8518      0.9630 
                      Agricultural loan                             0.5516            0.8540            0.0554           0.0634 
                      Other loan                                       0.8217            0.7909            0.0150          -0.0049 
                      Deposit to head bank                      0.8883            0.9176            0.0663           0.0319 
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slight product-specific scale economies but very close to constant returns to scale; no one 
has scope economies.  Economies of scale is lower than that in both North region and the 
country, which implies that the RCCs in Northeast were operating at a scale that deviated 
more from efficient level than in the North region and the country.  
          For East region, flow capital loan to TVEs, other loan, and deposit to other banks 
have decreasing returns to scale, while fixed assets loan to TVEs and agricultural loan 
have increasing returns to scale.  Economies of scope do not exist for all outputs and 
outputs were being produced in a region of decreasing return to scale.  
         For Middlesouth region, the product-specific economies of scale are very similar to 
those for east region.  Only flow capital loans to TVEs has economies of scope.  The 
RCCs were producing at a little decreasing returns to scale with relatively highest value 
of the measurement among all regions which implies the RCCs in middlesouth region 
were closest to the efficient scale among all regions.  
          The RCCs in Southwest had biggest product-specific scale economies on the 
output of fixed assets loan to TVEs with the measure value 3.0673 and smallest one on 
deposit to head bank with the measure value 0.5665.  This indicates that the RCCs in 
Southwest needs to increase their flow capital loan and decrease their deposits to the head 
bank.  Only deposit to head bank has a scope economies, which indicates that the 
splintering of production into the deposit to head bank and other outputs would increase 
the cost by 20.29%.  The splintering of production of other loans seems able to decrease 
cost tremendously.  For example, if flow capital loan to TVEs was produced alone and 
the other four products were produced, the cost would be reduced by 51.47%.  The 
overall scale diseconomies exist in Southwest region with smallest value of measurement   16
which implies the RCCs in Southwest were operating at a scale much further from 
efficient scale. 
          In the Northwest region, only loans to TVEs including flow capital and fixed assets 
loan have scale economies.  The economies of scope exist for agricultural loan and 
deposit to head bank.  The splintering of production into agricultural loan to TVEs and 
other outputs could increase cost by 6.3%.  Very slight overall scale diseconomies exist 
for RCCs in the Northwest region.  
        The imposition of curvature changes the estimates very little.  In addition, the 
imposition of curvature doesn’t substantially affect the input demand elasticities, which is 
consistent with the results found by Featherstone and Moss in a study of agricultural 
banking in U.S., in which the imposition of curvature did not materially affect most of the 
elasticity estimates.    
Results from Nonparametric Method 
 
          Since the efficiency estimates from nonparametric method are relative to the most 
efficient RCC in the sample which has a value of one, they cannot be directly compared 
to the estimates from parametric approach.  The efficiency estimates obtained from the 
nonparametric method are presented in table 4.  
          Surprisingly, all regions were very technically efficient with mean values above 
0.99.  This indicates that the RCCs in all regions adopted almost same practices.  They 
were operating very close to the relative production frontier.  All regions are allocative 
inefficient, which results from government control of factor markets such that the market 
can’t determine the interest rates and the price of other input according to the relative 
scarcity of resources.  Allocative inefficiency results in economic inefficiency. All 
regions didn’t have economies of scale.  And in terms of returns to scale, 13 out of 457   17




                                     Pure Technical              Allocative               Economic               Scale                Overall 
                                       Efficiency                   Efficiency               Efficiency           Efficiency          Efficiency 
 
Mean                                 0.99629                    0.44913                    0.44805               0.82092             0.35996 
Standard error                   0.00640                    0.25618                    0.25656               0.18814             0.22324 
Minimum                          0.97                          0.08                          0.08                     0.14268             0.06 
 
North 
                                    
                                     Pure Technical            Allocative                Economic                Scale                Overall 
                                       Efficiency                 Efficiency                Efficiency            Efficiency          Efficiency 
  
Mean                                0.99788                     0.48088                    0.48026               0.82916               0.40875      
Standard error                  0.00469                     0.25661                    0.25698               0.16062               0.26237                   
Minimum                         0.98                           0.1                            0.1                       0.37180               0.09 
 
Northeast 
                                     
                                     Pure Technical            Allocative                 Economic                Scale                 Overall 
                                       Efficiency                 Efficiency                 Efficiency            Efficiency          Efficiency 
 
Mean                               0.99542                      0.37333                     0.37192              0.87612               0.33333 
Standard error                 0.00651                      0.15303                     0.15348              0.10321               0.16178  




                                     Pure Technical           Allocative                  Economic                  Scale                Overall 
                                       Efficiency                Efficiency                  Efficiency             Efficiency           Efficiency 
   
Mean                               0.99723                     0.42134                      0.42049               0.87403              0.37063 
Standard error                 0.00506                     0.25986                      0.25997               0.11261              0.23076 




                                     Pure Technical           Allocative                  Economic                 Scale                Overall 
                                       Efficiency                Efficiency                  Efficiency             Efficiency          Efficiency 
 
Mean                                0.99455                   0.43830                        0.43697              0.90807              0.40250 
Standard error                  0.00772                   0.27647                        0.27717              0.09341              0.25912 




                                     Pure Technical           Allocative                  Economic                  Scale               Overall 
                                       Efficiency                Efficiency                  Efficiency              Efficiency         Efficiency 
 
Mean                                0.99735                  0.36612                        0.36518               0.86257                0.32102      
Standard error                  0.00531                  0.15178                        0.15163               0.12395                0.15118 




                                     Pure Technical           Allocative                    Economic                Scale               Overall 
                                       Efficiency                Efficiency                    Efficiency             Efficiency         Efficiency 
 
Mean                                 0.99525                  0.56450                        0.56305               0.58382             0.28925  
Standard error                   0.00779                  0.28723                        0.28795               0.25108             0.17200 
Minimum                          0.98                        0.09                              0.0882                 0.14268             0.06 
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RCCs faced decreasing returns to scale and all others faced increasing returns to scale.  
The overall efficiency is low, which ranged from 0.29 to 0.41.  That implies that the same 
level of outputs for RCCs could have been produced with about 59% to 71% less cost if 
all RCCs had been producing on the minimum cost frontier under constant returns to 
scale.  Most of overall inefficiencies are due to allocative inefficiencies for regions except 
the Northwest, which is also partly due to scale inefficiency.   
Conclusions 
 
          In this study, we employ both parametric and nonparametric methods to evaluate 
the economies of scale and efficiencies of Chinese Rural Credit Cooperatives across 16-
year period.  
          From the results of parametric approach, the RCCs in all regions did not have 
economies of scale and they were operating in a region of slightly decreasing returns to 
scale.  Therefore RCCs in those regions need to decrease their size to get cost efficiency, 
but effect is not significant.  RCCs in most regions did not have economies of scope.  
Thus, combining rural lending into an institution that currently does not have such loans 
will not lead to scope economies.  That shows potentially that the five kinds of loans lent 
by RCCs need to be separated.  However, the effect was small except in Southwest 
region.  Therefore, restructuring of RCCs in Southwest seems more necessary.  One 
suggestion is to transfer these loan services to other banks, e.g., local agricultural bank or 
other commercial bank, to achieve cost efficiency.  In addition, the flow capital loans to 
TVEs in Northeast and Northwest and fixed assets loan to TVEs in Northeast also need to 
be transfered from RCCs to other banks based on economies of scope.  RCCs in some 
regions do have economies of scope on some outputs.  For example, combining flow   19
capital loan to TVEs into the RCCs in North region that currently do not have that 
lending leads to scope economies and could reduce costs.  
  The results of nonparametric approach show that RCCs in all regions are all pure 
technical efficiency.  However, since the measurement is a relative comparison, it does 
not mean that all RCCs have adopted the best practices for financial services other than 
RCCs.  They need to compare with more modern financial services like those in 
developed countries and learn from them to improve the efficiency.  RCCs in all regions 
are not allocative efficient.  This may indicate that the input market in China is still 
distorted by government policies, which needs efforts from the government to liberalize 
the financial market.  Most RCCs are economicly inefficient and overall inefficient due to 
the lack of allocative efficiency.    
          The results could provide insight into guidelines for the current effort to reform and 
restructure RCCs in China.  But in addition, the government needs to regulate the 
intervention from local governments and local branches of state banks.  In the meantime, 
the RCCs need to increase the employees’ professional skill to decrease and further 
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